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Abstract
China’s transformation from a net food exporter to a 
net food importer has occurred in a very short period of 
time and this has implications for both China and the 
world. This paper argues that there is strategic and 
practical significance in China-Africa agricultural 
cooperation, as the current import structure of food and 
other agricultural products is imbalanced and China’s 
food supply-demand imbalances will continue to expand. 
This raises the possibility of political and economic crisis 
for China and threatens those poor countries who are 
relying on international food markets. Africa possesses 
substantial areas of arable land that can be developed 
and utilised; thus, China-Africa agricultural cooperation 
can potentially enhance African nations’ productive 
capacity and contribute to local food security, through 
which it can indirectly improve global food security and 
stabilise the international food market under China’s 
increasing food demand context. 
Keywords: China, Africa, Food security, Agricultural 
cooperation
Introduction
China is the world’s largest food market and Chinese 
consumption has widespread repercussions because of 
the increasingly global reach of how and where that food 
is produced (GRAIN 2012). Over the last several decades, 
China has kept a watchful eye on food security, especially 
after the Great Chinese Famine which occurred from 
1958-1961 and harmed the entire nation. It has put forth 
a great effort and demonstrated that with technological 
development and innovation, the country is capable of 
feeding 22 percent of the world’s population with only 
7 percent of its cultivated land and 6 percent of its fresh 
water. Despite this achievement, the international 
community has continued to debate China’s food 
security, exemplified in the title of the 1995 book Who 
Will Feed China? (Brown 1995). In November 2008, China’s 
National Development and Reform Commission 
promulgated the ‘National Medium and Long-term 
Program for Food Security (2008-2020),’ and set the main 
index to ensure national food security in 2020 to be ‘a 
stable domestic food and consumption ratio [namely its 
self-sufficiency rate of grain] of more than 95%.’ Other 
key indicators included the protection of land resources 
and sustainable agricultural development. There is no 
denying that over the past six decades, the country has 
made great strides in food production and demonstrated 
that China can rely on its own capacity to realise food 
self-sufficiency. 
The concept of ‘food’ (粮食) in the discussions of 
Chinese scholars has both a broad and narrow sense, 
and both of these are much more specific than the English 
word. In a narrow sense, food refers to the category of 
cereals. This includes rice, wheat, maize and others, in 
line with the definition of ‘cereal’ given by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In 
the broader sense, Chinese scholars may also use food 
to refer to a collection of cereals, beans and potato. This 
paper uses the narrow sense of food, but also looks at 
the importance of soybean, usually classified as a ‘grain 
legume’ or ‘pulse’. 
Traditionally Chinese diets have been based on rice, 
wheat and coarse grain (mainly maize). This is usually 
divided in terms of Northern Chinese diets based on 
wheat and coarse grain to make foods such as noodles, 
steamed buns (馒头) and millet porridge (粥). Southern 
Chinese diets by contrast have largely been based on 
rice, either by boiling the grains or by grounding it into 
flour to produce dumpling skins and noodles. These food 
customs are deeply engrained in local culture by now, 
as any visitor to China will know, and so it is unlikely that 
the demand for rice, wheat and coarse grains will be 
significantly displaced by any other agricultural products 
in the near future (Ma and Lan 2008: 117). Although 
soybean is also involved in staple Chinese diets (for its 
oils or the production of tofu, for example), it is most 
important in China’s current agricultural sector as animal 
feed, as will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Demand for these four agricultural products has grown 
significantly over the past few decades, and is set to grow 
even more in the coming years. This is largely explained 
by both growing population pressures and rising 
incomes, the latter often associated with urbanisation. 
This paper will begin by looking at the nature of China’s 
population growth, income growth and urbanisation and 
their impacts on the use of cereals in traditional Chinese 
diets. This will be followed by a look at how Chinese diets 
are shifting, and the implications of a growing meat 
market. Lastly this paper will look at the role of imports 
to meet these increased demands and the politics that 
surrounds these dependencies. 
Population and pressures on 
maize, rice and wheat
By the late 1990s China’s grain production had 
achieved a basic balance between total supply and 
demand, and at this stage it witnessed a structural 
surplus. After entry to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001, however, China fully liberalised its food 
markets and its grain market entered into a new stage 
in the regulation of the relationship between supply and 
demand. The grain production cost in China is not only 
higher than in the USA and other developed countries 
but also higher than in African countries; therefore, 
producers in China were unable to compete against their 
counterparts in the USA and Africa. By 2014, China’s grain 
production had witnessed continuous growth for eleven 
consecutive years and the total output exceeded 500m 
tons for seven consecutive years, providing solid support 
for coping with the impact of the international financial 
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crisis and for maintaining stable and rapid economic 
development. On the whole, China’s food security 
situation is good. For example, comprehensive grain 
production capacity is steadily improving, the food 
supply is increasingly diversified and supply and demand 
are almost balanced. But from the perspective of 
development trends, the situation of rain-fed farming 
has not changed fundamentally; grain output fluctuates 
with rainfall and faces high risk of drought disaster.
Even before the challenges of market liberalisation, 
academics were forecasting acute gaps in China’s ability 
to match grain supply with grain demand. In the early 
1990s, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
predicted that by 2020, China’s total grain demand would 
reach 650-710m tons while grain output would come to 
640-680m tons. This would mean there would be a supply 
and demand gap of 40m tons or so (Research Group of 
the Food Development in Medium and Long Term in 
China, 1991). Ma and Gao’s (1993) ‘Research Report on 
Chinese Food’ separately produced findings consistent 
with this, stating that by 2020, the average grain shortfall 
in China would reach 40-52m tons. Huang and Rozelle 
(1998: 25) predicted that with people’s increasing 
demand for livestock and aquatic products, the total food 
supply in China would fall short of demand after the 
mid-1990s and China would turn from a rice exporter 
into a rice importer. More recently, Ma and Lan (2008: 
129) have predicted that by 2020, China’s total 
consumption demand for food will reach 546.4m tons, 
including 186m tons of rice, 97.7m tons of wheat and 
165.4m tons of maize, and Zhu(2004) predicted that 
Chinese demand for food will peak at 600m tons. In short, 
China’s grain supply is inadequate and the import of an 
appropriate amount of food is needed for the long run 
(Wan 2008). 
Other recent scholars give similar forecasts, vindicating 
concerns from the 1990s. Lu et al. (2011) concluded that 
China’s food gap will expand from 10.24m tons in 2007 
to 59.58m tons in 2020, and declines in maize and 
soybean self-sufficiency rates will be the most obvious. 
Lv and Hu (2012) predicted that China’s grain 
consumption, production and imports in 2020 will be, 
respectively, 695m tons, 644m tons and 49m tons, and 
the overall food import proportion will be 7.08 percent. 
Huang et al. (2012) predicted that China’s grain output 
will reach 575m tons in 2020, with an average annual 
growth of approximately 0.52 percent, but the demand 
for food will reach 663m tons in 2020, with an average 
annual growth of about 1.1 percent. Thus China’s overall 
food self-sufficiency rate will decrease from 92.5 percent 
in 2009 to 87 percent in 2020. The self-sufficiency rate 
of maize will decrease significantly. By 2020, the maize 
supply-demand gap will be about 20m tons and the self-
sufficiency rate will drop to 91 percent. The soybean 
supply and demand gap will further expand. By 2020, 
import of soybean is expected to reach 72m tons and 
the self-sufficiency rate will drop to 18 percent. If soybean 
is included in the calculation, therefore, in 2020, China’s 
grain supply-demand gap will reach 100m tons.
However, these problems are confounded by the fact 
that China is also facing a serious shift in its consumption 
patterns. With ongoing rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation, the population continues to increase and 
its overall structure evolves. By the end of 2013, 730m 
Chinese people are estimated to be living in urban areas, 
which equates to 53 percent of the entire Chinese 
population. This is the first time in China that urban 
people have exceeded those living in the countryside. 
At the same time, in addition to the increasing demand 
for food—which shows a rigid growth trend—food 
consumption habits have also changed and people have 
begun to pay more attention to the quality rather than 
quantity of food. From the perspective of market demand, 
rural-to-urban migration has led to increased 
consumption of meat, which in turn has resulted in a 
large demand for feed grain. The per capita consumption 
and aggregate demand for rice and wheat, however, 
show a downtrend. Huang et al. (2012) pointed out that 
from 2000 to 2009, China’s total demand for rice witnessed 
an average annual decline of 0.7 percent; total demand 
for wheat witnessed an average annual decline of 0.3 
percent; and the future consumption demand for rice 
and wheat was also projected to decrease. With continued 
flows of migrant workers to cities, the number of 
agricultural products consumed is expected to increase, 
bringing dynamic structural changes. 
Dietary patterns based on singular starchy foods have 
therefore become more diverse, including meat, eggs 
and milk. Ma (1997) believes that each increase of one 
percentage point in the level of urbanisation will lead to 
an increase of 10.54m tons in food consumption, and 
every increase of ten percentage points in per capita 
GNP will increase indirect food consumption by 4.3m 
tons. Wang and Sun (2003) conducted a comparative 
analysis of the relationship between income and 
household food consumption structure among the 
residents of China’s 31 provinces and autonomous 
regions except Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan in 2001 
and drew the conclusion that with the increase in their 
income, people have higher demands for dairy products, 
meat, wine and beverages than for cereals, oil and other 
basic foods.
Thus, urbanisation has driven the consumption of 
livestock, aquatic products, fruits and other non-staple 
food and reduced the consumption of energy-supply 
food (Huang and Rozelle 1998: 153-170). In 2009, China’s 
annual per capita consumption of livestock and poultry 
products was about 53kg (including meat, eggs and milk)
in 1995 it was 28kg, and in 2000 it was 39kg. As of 2012, 
China’s meat consumption was about twice that of the 
United States, reaching 71m tons (Brown 2012: 21). Based 
on this trend, according to the National Bureau of 
Statistics, the demand for industrial grain will reach 88bn 
kg by 2020 (Wan 2008). 
About 8kg of grain feed is needed for the production 
of 1kg of beef, and 2kg of grain feed is needed for the 
production of 1kg of chicken (Yin 2009), which means 
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that changes in people’s diet structure directly lead to 
rapid growth of feed grain demand. The proportion of 
feed grain and industrial grain in national food 
consumption rose from 16 percent in 1990 to 26 percent 
in 2003 (Ma and Lan 2008: 117). From 2003 to 2008, feed 
grain consumption by aquaculture also witnessed an 
average annual increase of 3 percent or so (Wan 2008). 
Correspondingly, the consumption and total demand 
for wheat and rice, the main staples of the food structure, 
both show a downtrend, while the proportion of maize, 
the main feed, rises. Some scholars have predicted that 
the increase in the size of China’s food shortages in future 
will mainly be in feed grain rather than staples such as 
rice (Huang and Rozelle 1998: 255). 
Table 1: China’s poultry and livestock products in the period 2007-2013
Domestic livestock production (ten thousand tons)
Meat Pork Beef Mutton Milk Eggs
2007 6865.72 4287.82 613.41 382.62 3525.24 2528.98
2008 7278.74 4620.50 613.17 380.35 3555.82 2702.20
2009 7649.75 4890.76 635.54 389.42 3518.84 2742.47
2010 7925.83 5071.24 653.06 398.86 3575.62 2762.74
2011 7965.14 5060.43 647.49 393.10 3657.85 2811.42
2012 8387.24 5342.70 662.26 400.99 3743.60 2861.17
2013 8535.02 5493.03 673.21 408.14 3531.42 2876.06
Source: calculated based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
Figure 1: Meat Consumption in China, 1975-2015 (cited in Brown 2014)
Some scholars have predicted that China’s GDP will 
increase by 6.5 percent per year from 2007, its population 
will reach 1.45bn, and roughly 53.38 percent of the 
population will live in urban areas by 2020. However, 
China’s arable land area will remain at 120m ha. At the 
same time, China’s grain supply and demand will also 
face the opportunities and challenges of the appreciation 
of the Chinese RMB, the rapid development of biofuels 
and the improvement of domestic food subsidies in the 
context of globalisation. Although the specific figures 
based on different methods are slightly different, scholars 
believe that China’s future food self-sufficiency rate can 
hardly remain at 95 percent, and it may already fall below 
this measurement (Schneider 2014), so it is inevitable 
that China will become a major importer of food in the 
future (Lv and Hu 2012; Lu et al. 2011; Huang et al. 1996). 
That is to say, from 2015 to 2020, China’s oversupply of 
food will change to short supply and the domestic food 
gap will further expand. The question, therefore, is not 
just how much food will China need in the future, but 
who will supply it? 
Political analysis of imports
China has gradually turned from a net food exporter 
to a net food importer. Wheat, rice and maize, the three 
major staple foods, all need to be imported. In addition, 
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since 2010, other agricultural products such as grain, 
cotton, oil, sugar, milk and meat have all been imported 
more and more. In sum, China has become increasingly 
dependent on other countries to meet its agricultural 
demands, most notably due to its increased demand for 
animal feed. 
In 2013, China imported grain (including soybean for 
animal feed) exceeding 84m tons, which is nearly equal 
to the amount produced in that year by the two top 
agricultural provinces. Among these imports, 63.38m 
tons were soybean. After World War II, the United States, 
Brazil and Argentina became the major exporters of 
soybean and China the fourth in rank. Since the late 
1990s, however, China’s soybean imports have been 
growing, overtaking exports in 1996. China’s soybean 
imports exceeded 10m tons in 2000, exceeding domestic 
production for the first time, and reached 20.74m tons 
in 2003, mainly from the United States. In 2010, soybean 
imports were nearly 55m tons, accounting for 80 percent 
of China’s total demand for soybean; by 2012, demand 
had reached 58.38m tons. At the same time, China 
imported 2m tons of soybean oil, equivalent to more 
than 1,000 tons of soybean. These imports mostly come 
from the United States, Brazil and Argentina, who 
contribute roughly 90 percent to the total trade volume. 
Over the past 17 years, the soybean imports purchased 
by China accounted for nearly 60 percent of the 
international trade volume of soybean (Brown 2012). The 
latest data predicted that China would import 76m tons 
of soybean between October 2014 and September 2015 
due to the improvement of requirements for soybean 
meal.
Furthermore, the imports of other agricultural 
products also showed increasing trends, arousing 
concern from the public (Huang et al. 2012). Before 2011, 
China only allowed the import of a small amount of high-
quality rice and wheat and almost no maize was imported. 
In 2012, however, China became the world’s second 
largest rice and barley importer and ranked the world’s 
top ten and top twenty in terms of import of maize and 
wheat.1  
With regards to maize, in the 1990s China’s average 
annual maize exports exceeded 5.5m, and this reached 
16m tons in 2003. From 2004 to 2009, however, the 
exports of maize witnessed an average annual decline 
of 2.6m tons or so. In 2010, China became a net importer 
of maize and imported a total of 1.57m tons of maize 
from abroad. Meanwhile, China also imported 3.16m tons 
of dried distillers grains (a by-product of ethanol 
production) to meet domestic demand for maize and 
soybean meal. In 2011 and 2012, the import of maize 
was respectively 1.75m tons and 5m tons, with an annual 
growth of 185 percent.2  During this period the United 
States was China’s largest source of imported maize, 
accounting for 98 percent of the supply (Lv and Hu 2012). 
Farmers in Wisconsin, a major grain-producing area of 
the United States, benefited hugely as China’s imports 
grew nearly 50 percent every year (Liu 2013). Wang (2013) 
believes that the three main reasons China’s maize 
imports increased so rapidly were i) to stockpile reserves; 
ii) to meet the rising demands for animal feed; and iii) 
because overseas maize was cheaper than China’s 
domestic output. According to the Chinese Food 
Network（中华粮网）, for example, from the fourth 
quarter of 2011 to the first half of 2012, the price of 
imported maize in South China was, on the whole, lower 
than that of maize from northeast China. This 
phenomenon is not restricted to maize, as lower prices 
have become one of the reasons why China imports 
increasingly large numbers of agricultural products. In 
fact, data shows that in 2013 China also imported over 
1m tons of meat (including 553,000 tons of beef and 
mutton, and 584,000 tons of pork). 
In terms of rice, in the past five decades China was a 
net importer for only four years. Since 2011, China 
became a net importer of rice for two consecutive years. 
In 2011, China’s total import of rice was 570,000 tons. In 
2012, this figure hit a record high, reaching 2.4m tons, 
with an increase of more than 320 percent. Before 2011, 
China mainly imported high-quality rice from the 
Thailand at a high price. In 2012, however, China also 
started importing lower-quality rice from Vietnam 
(accounting for 66.7 percent of the total imports), 
Pakistan (accounting for 25 percent) and Thailand 
(accounting for 7.6 percent). This was mainly by domestic 
Chinese enterprises for the purposes of processing rice 
noodles and rice wine. In addition, over the past four 
years, the amount of wheat imports also rapidly increased. 
In 2011, China’s imports of wheat reached 1.25m tons. 
In 2012, this figure was 4m tons or so, with an increase 
of 220 percent, 3 of which two-thirds came from Australia, 
mainly to be used as feedstuff. 
More and more, therefore, China’s domestic agricultural 
producers are facing competition from lower prices on 
the global market. A comparison of some of China’s key 
agricultural imports versus their costs when domestically 
produced is presented in the table below. 
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Agricultural Product Price of imported 
(CIF, RMB/ton)
Price of domestic produced 
(RMB/ton)
Price gap (RMB/ton)
Indica rice (Thailand) 3329 3800 471
Wheat 2017 2400 23
Maize 1766 2400 634
Soybean 3900 4800 900
Rapeseed 3977 5100 1023
Cotton 15400 19800 4400
Sugar 3000 5000 2000
Beef/mutton 26000 ~ 52000 ~ 26000
Pork 12000 ~ 24000 ~ 12000
Table 2: Comparison between imported and domestic agricultural products  (August 2014)
Data Source: sorted out according to Chen Xiwen’s keynote Speech on the 2nd Longping Forum. 24 Nov. 2014. See links: http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2014-11-24/092231192687.
shtml. [红网，陈锡文：中国农业发展形势及面临的挑战，2014年11月24日]
China’s food imports under 
globalisation
No country is immune to the impacts of food shortages 
(Brown 2009). Food security is a global problem, not just 
China’s own problem, and so it is important that Chinese 
food security be analysed and discussed from a global 
perspective. Part of the problem is the dominance of a 
few producer countries. From 1990 to 2007, for example, 
among the 176 countries covered by FAO statistics, we 
can see from the table below that the number of net 
food-importing countries is much greater than the net 
food-exporting countries for all four key crops discussed 
in this paper. 
Wheat Maize Soybean Rice
1990-
1992
2005-
2007
1990-
1992
2005-
2007
1990-
1992
2005-
2007
1990-
1992
2005-
2007
Number of countries in 
sample
176 176 175 175 127 127 176 176
Number of net importers 147 147 129 145 73 98 143 154
Number of net exporters 25 29 23 28 16 17 25 20
Number of countries not 
involved in import or export
4 0 23 2 38 12 8 2
Table 3: Analysis of grain trade of various countries (1990-2007)
Source: Based on relevant data of FAO and Food Security Statistics; cited from Bao (2011)
Figure 2: Source countries of China’s cereal imports in 2013 (millions of tons)
Source：Agricultural Trade Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, etc. China Agricultural Trade Development Report 2014, Beijing: China Agricultural Press. 2014: 25[
农业部农产品贸易办公室等，中国农产品贸易发展报告（2014），北京：中国农业出版社，2014:25]
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Affected by climate change and other factors, food is 
in increasingly short supply, and as a result a new 
geopolitics of food has gradually formed (Brown 2012: 
8). Currently, China mainly imports grains from countries 
with surplus food production, such as the Unites States 
and Australia. To guarantee China’s food security in the 
future, though, it is important to take into account 
political and economic risks in the context of globalisation.
Firstly, when the world’s cereal production cannot 
meet the demand, some exporting countries will limit 
exports to curb domestic food prices. For instance, when 
grain and soybean prices soared in the United States in 
the 1970s, the country immediately restricted exports. 
When global grain and soybean prices rose during the 
2008 global food crisis, Russia and Argentina restricted 
wheat exports and Vietnam restricted rice exports to 
ensure national food supply (Brown 2009). 
To mitigate such risks, several countries have sought 
to boost agricultural production by purchasing or renting 
land in other countries, but this has also encountered 
some challenges. For example, some Chinese provincial 
enterprises signed agreements with the Philippines to 
rent 2.24m ha of land to plant maize. However, the 
entirety of the Philippines has a total of only 5.3m ha of 
arable land. In the end, the Philippines annulled the 
agreement. Even many countries with a large land area, 
such as Brazil, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand, have 
laws and regulations that prohibit large-scale land lease 
by foreign countries (Chen 2012). 
Secondly, there is a lot of risk in food price volatility. One 
such factor with regards to grain is the high proportion 
used for automotive fuel in the United States. In 2009 
alone, one-fourth of US grain(粮食) was used to produce 
automotive fuel, and according to the consumption level 
at that time, this grain were enough to feed 125m 
Americans or 500m Indians (Brown 2009). From 2005 to 
2011, the amount of maize used for fuel production in 
the United States rose from 41m tons to 127m tons, 
accounting for one-third of the total production and 
leading food prices to rise. In addition to this, climate 
change such as drought is also an important factor 
affecting global maize production and prices. In 2012, 
the United States’ maize belt suffered a severe drought, 
dramatically reducing production. As a result, the 
international market price of maize soared. As of 
mid-2012, the world’s wheat, maize and soybean prices 
nearly doubled than the highest price in the history, 
reaching the highest prices in history (Brown 2012: 
29-30). 
Thirdly, political contexts also affect the international 
grain market. One concern that China has is that some 
exporting countries may use food as a weapon to achieve 
political objectives. For this reason, China has been 
reluctant to import large quantities of food (Lin 2004). 
In addition, although some major grain-producing 
countries such as Ukraine still have huge potential to 
increase food production, their turbulent political 
situation could easily affect the fragile international grain 
market and bring about rising food prices.
Facing the great challenge of China’s soaring grain 
imports, the Chinese government has been promoting 
the diversification of import channels. Moreover, its two 
major grain traders, COFCO and China Grain Reserves 
Corporation, who are tasked with much of China’s grain 
imports, are also constantly looking for new import 
sources around the world. With regards to rice imports, 
for example, it was reported by Liu (2013) that China 
Grain Reserves Corporation’s Guangzhou Branch 
imported 200,000 tons of all kinds of rice from Cambodia 
in 2011 at the price of US$800 per ton of Grade I rice and 
US$500 per ton of Grade II rice. In the same year, COFCO 
also signed a contract on rice imports with Cambodian 
rice exporters and the first batch of imports was 100 tons. 
At the end of December 2012, COFCO then signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Ukraine 
Farming Group, the largest agricultural enterprise in 
Ukraine, which planned to export at least 5m tons of 
maize to China every year in the coming five years. The 
Group was approved by the Chinese government to 
import maize to China and is now seeking import licenses 
for soybean and wheat. In January 2015, Ukraine 
transported 470,047 tons of maize to China, which exceed 
the quantity from the US in that month. 4
Conclusion
Since 1949, China has accumulated a wealth of 
experience and attained significant achievements in 
agricultural production, making important contributions 
to domestic food security while simultaneously 
promoting the world’s food security. However, with the 
acceleration of industrialisation and urbanisation in 
China, land, labour and other resource constraints (i.e. 
overuse of fertiliser and pesticide) pose limits on further 
increases in food production. At the same time, 
urbanisation has altered most Chinese food consumption 
habits, resulting in a tight balance between food supply 
and demand in an inevitable trend. Within this context, 
China’s entry into the WTO has also weakened China’s 
ability to meet its own demands. As a result of all of these 
factors, it seems likely that China will increasingly rely 
on the international market to fill the gaps between 
domestic food supply and demand. This will require a 
keen awareness of -*/both the opportunities and pitfalls 
present in the geopolitics of food. 
End Note
i College of Humanities and Development Studies/
Research Center for International Development, 
China Agricultural University, Beijing, 100193; 
ii Forestry Department of Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region, Nanjing, 530028
1  He Li, Chinese cereal buying spree redraws “red 
line” , Financial Times, December 14, 2012; the State 
Council Information Office, Surge in China’s grain 
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imports poses no threat to global grain supplies, 
portal website of the State Council Information 
Office www.scio.gov.cn, February 19, 2013, accessed 
on April 30, 2013。[何丽，中国谷物进口“红
线”松动，金融时报，2012年12月14日；国务
院新闻办公室，中国粮食进口“威胁论”太夸
张，国务院新闻办公室门户网站www.scio.gov.cn, 
2013年2月19日]
2  Finance News, See China’s Food Security from Rice 
Imports, January 16, 2013 http://futures.cfi.cn/
P20130116000545.html, [Accessed on: April 30, 
2013]. [中财网，从大米进口看中国粮食安
全，2013年1月16日，http://futures.cfi.cn/
P20130116000545.html ]
3  Finance News, See China’s Food Security from Rice 
Imports, January 16, 2013, http://futures.cfi.cn/
P20130116000545.html, [Accessed on: April 30, 
2013] [中财网，从大米进口看中国粮食安
全，2013年1月16日，http://futures.cfi.cn/
P20130116000545.html ]
4 Reference News: “China imported a large number 
of corn from Ukraine and Britain Midia said this 
desolated the US corn, see: http://www.
cankaoxiaoxi.com/finance/20150318/708080.
shtml, 2015-3-18. Accessed on 15th Aug. 2015. [参
考消息网，中国大量进口乌克兰玉米  英媒：
美国玉米受冷落。2015年3月18日。]
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